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SYNOPSIS
This thesis undertakes theoretical and empirical analyses to estimate 
the welfare effects of tariffs on U.K. imports of manufactured products. 
The analyses differ from the standard model of tariffs and welfare by 
explicitly allowing for product differentiation between imports and home 
products and for home firms’ prices exceeding their costs of production.
The theoretical analysis makes use of a simple partial equilibrium model 
to examine the effects of tariffs on home industry’s profit and on the 
welfare of consumers of home and foreign products. A prediction of the 
model is that tariffs may generate welfare gains as well as losses.
Estimation of the welfare gains and losses required quantitative 
information about the manner in which home firms' prices and output are 
affected by tariffs. This information was obtained with the help of 
multiple regression analyses involving a sample of forty.U.K. industries.
The regression estimates of the price-output response of home firms were 
then used to estimate the welfare effects of a hypothetical cut in U.K. 
tariffs. The calculations suggest that tariff reduction may generate 
welfare losses well in excess of any corresponding welfare gain.
(ii)
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CHAPTER 1-
TARIFFS AND ECONOMIC WELFARE :
Traditional Theory
1.1 Introduction :
Tariff policy has in most countries been a widely discussed issue, 
because it is believed to have important implications for the 
welfare of the countries concerned. Tariffs have been imposed at 
various times in history. During the eighteenth century and at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century tariffs were used primarily to 
raise government revenue, but since that time other motives have 
also played a part.
At the beginning of the present century and up to World War I,
England and other European countries were free trading nations. 
However, the period between the two wars, particularly the period 
of the Great Depression, witnessed an increase in the use cf tariffs 
and other trading impedi m e n t s ^  . Since World War II and until the 
early 1970s, the trend, especially among leading industrial nations, 
has been towards trade liberalisation. The Bretton Woods Conference 
held in 1944 was the starting point for a new world economic order. 
The "International Monetary Fund" (IMF, established in 1944) and the 
"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" (IBRD, 
established in 1946) were all designed to take care of international 
economic affairs among the nations.
(1) Bo SiJderstan (1971). International Economics, Macmillan 
Student Editions, London, pp. 342.
The establishment of these organisations was followed by the signing 
of the "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (GATT, established 
in 1947); the latter provided the framework for international 
negotiation for tariff reduction.
The rules of GATT have two main provisions. They require that :
any proposed change in the tariffs (or any other type of 
commercial policy) of a member country should not be 
undertaken without prior consultation of other parties 
to the. agreement, and
the contracting parties should work towards the reduction 
of tariffs and other international trade impediments, and 
these efforts must be conducted within the framework of 
GATT.
The major principle of GATT is the maintenance of non-discrimination.- 
This requires that a member country's tariffs, on a particular 
commodity, should not discriminate between other member countries.
Our major interest here is to study the effects of protection on the 
welfare of a country. These effects are likely to vary according 
to the method of analyses employed. Let us commence with a review
of the "traditional model" for analysing the welfare cost of tariffs.
1.2 The Traditional Theory of Tariffs :
The traditional theory of tariffs has been formulated in the framework
(i)
(ii)
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of-perfect competition, by which all the products in market are 
homogeneous, and there are no barriers to entry. In this theory 
the costs or' gains of protection stem from the following sources :
(a) A misallocation of resources among producers
(b) A misallocation of expenditure among consumers
(c) The terms of trade effect
In the first instance let us ignore the effect of terms of trade.
This means we are only concerned with "small" countries, whose tariffs 
do not affect the world price of the commodity in question.
1*2.1. The 'Small* Country Case :
The analysis can be presented with the use of Fig.(1). Importables 
are shown along the horizontal axis, while prices are represented 
vertically. The supply curve for the importables of domestic
producers is S S 1. The domestic demand curve for the product is d d 1.
This represents the demand for -imports and domestic production 
combined. It is a compensated demand curve. This means that 
consumers are compensated against the loss of utility in their income. 
Thus the price change has only a substitution effect. OP is the 
world price. At this price home consumption is OC, of which OK is 
produced by domestic producers, and the rest is supplied by imports 
KC. With a tariff of P P ’/OP per cent, the home market price will
increase to O P 1. This price rise will encourage the domestic
producers to increase their output to O K ’, while home consumption 
will be reduced to 0 C ‘, and imports will fall to K'C1. Now consider
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FIGURE 1
P r i c e s
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the welfare effects of the tariff; the consumer surplus is reduced 
by PP'EF. This is partly offset by an increase in producers' 
surplus PP'HG, and revenues collected by the government HJDE. 
Therefore, two triangles GHJ and DEF represent the net welfare loss. 
These are called the production cost and the consumption cost 
respectively.
An alternative way of explaining the net welfare costs is as follows: 
The production cost is the excess of the domestic cost of producing 
the amount of KK' compared with the cost of importing the same amount. 
Correspondingly, the consumption cost measures the loss of utility 
when consumption decreases by CC' over and above the saving in the 
cost of importing that amount. The above argument may easily be 
extended to deal with' the case of a domestic monopoly. The main 
point is that, since the country is a price taker in world market, 
the monopolistic marginal revenue will equal the average revenue. 
Consequently, the price and output of the monopolist would be the same 
as that of uhe perfectly competitive industry, analysed above.
The two above-mentioned costs may be formulated as follows : If dC
is the decrease in consumption, dQ is the increase in the production
of home products, P is the world price of the product, and t is thew
tariff rate, expressed as a proportion of the world price. We can 
write :
Consumption cost = h dCt Pw ( 1 )
Production cost = h dQt P .w (2)
-  5 -
IT h e r e f o r e
Total Costs = h (dC + dQ) t P W (3)
The decrease in the values of imports (dM), resulting from the 
imposition of a tariff is equal to the sum of the decrease in 
consumption (dC) - the direct price effect - and the increase in 
production (dQ) - the substitution effect. Thus :
dM = dC + dQ
substituting equation (4) into (3) we have
(4)
Total costs = h (dM) tP,
where dM = e .m
W
dP,W
W.
M
(5)
(6)
Therefore :
Total costs = h dP e W 
m —
W
MtP,W
(7)
where e^ is the price elasticity of imports, and M is the volume of 
imports before tariff imposition. It is well known that the price 
elasticity of imports is a weighted average of the price elasticity 
of domestic demand and of domestic supply. This is proven as follows: 
We had :
w h ere
dM
dC
dQ + dQ
dP e W
(4)
(8 )
-  6  -
T h e r e f o r e :
dM
 W
pr, (e C - e O) W ( c Q J ( 1 0 )
Dividing both sides by M, we obtain :
dM
M P,W
W e C
( 1 1 )
so that: e
dM
M
( 1 2 )m dP,
W
e C
C 77
P,w
where is the price elasticity of demand for the product, and e^ 
is the price elasticity of the domestic supply of the product.
The "large" country case :
Up to this point the analysis has considered the case of a "small" 
country, which is a price taker in the world market. Relaxing this 
assumption leads to the possibility that the tariff will improve the 
country's terms of trade. This "terms of trade" effect is a source 
of welfare gain to the country and must be set against the two 
elements of welfare loss discussed above. This case is presented 
in Fig.(2). Imports are shown on the horizontal axis and prices on 
the vertical axis. The foreign supply curve is HH'0 The domestic 
demand for imports is shown by DD' ; this is obtained by subtracting 
the domestic supply of the product from the home demand for the 
product. OW is the import price under free trade. The amount
imported is OM. Now suppose a tariff of WU q_/0W per cent is imposed.
The tariff-inclusive foreign supply curve is W  . The equilibrium
Prices
FIGURE 2
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domestic price will now be OZ^ the foreign price will be OZ and the 
quantity of imports will be OM^. In comparison with the free trade 
situation the foreign price has been lowered by Z^W. The amount of 
duty collected by the government will be ZZ^GJ. Against this is the 
welfare loss WZ^GQ, showing the loss to consumer surplus (net of the 
gain to produce surplus) . This means that the country has a welfare
gain if ZWKJ exceeds GKQ. The essence of the above argument is that
a "large" country may benefit from imposing an appropriate rate of 
tariff. .The present study is concerned with the U.K. manufacturing 
industries in 1963 and 1968. At that time the U.K. had not yet 
become a member of European Economic Community (EEC). The imports 
of the manufacturing goods to the U.K. in comparison with the world 
demand for these goods were not at that time large enough to 
characterise the U.K. as a large country0 We are therefore faced 
with a "small" country case with respect to the purpose of this 
research.
The analysis has so far dealt with the simple case of only one 
imported good. Extending the analysis to the case of two or more 
imported goods raises two problems, discussed among authors by 
H.G. Johnson (1971). Firstly, tariffs may lead to substitution 
between foreign goods and domestic goods, and secondly, some goods 
may begin to be produced for the first time. However, as Johnson
had shown an evaluation of the effects of these two possibilities 
requires information concerning the substitution elasticities among 
different foreign and domestic goods. As such information cannot 
readily be obtained for the U.K* we will therefore abstract from
-  9 -
t h e s e  p r o b le m s  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .
Ihe standard model assumes that domestic firms set their prices equal
to marginal costs, which - in equilibrium - equals the long-run average
cost. This assumption, however, is at variance with empirical 
(1 )evidence , which suggests that, firms are able to raise their prices 
above long-run marginal costs, and thereby earn excess profits. In 
In view of such evidence it seems desirable to extend the welfare 
analysis of tariff and explicitly allow for situations in which firms 
set their prices above the competitive level. This is the subject 
of the next chapter.
(1) Bain J.S. (1972). Essay on Price Theory and Industrial 
Organisation. Boston, Little Brown and Co.
CHAPTER 2
OLIGOPOLY AND PROTECTION
This chapter extends the analysis of tariffs and their welfare 
effects by incorporating the role of large domestic firms, whereas 
in the traditional theory of tariffs, concerned with situations of 
pure competion, the equilibrium market price always equals the long- 
run marginal costs cf production. The existence of large firms in 
the economy suggests that prices are likely to exceed the marginal 
cost even in the long-run. The ability to raise price above the 
marginal cost may be greater the greater the market power of the firm. 
Market power in the present context should allow for the degree of 
foreign competition. Imports are likely to exert an important 
negative influence on profit margins. Conversely, tariff may 
increase the margins.
The important implication of the above argument is that if the home 
industry is dominated by few large firms, the imposition of tariffs 
may generate welfare gains as well as losses.
The task of this chapter is to analyse these gains and losses.
Ideally, such analysis requires a model of tariffs in the context of 
an oligopolistic market. In practice, however, such a model would 
face the problem that an oligopolistic firm's reaction to tariffs 
may depend on the reactions expected from home and foreign rivals. 
Archibald (1959) has argued that the number of competing firms is not 
an important factor. What is important is the firm's presumption of 
its rivals behaviour. The firm concerned may simply ignore the
-  1 1  -
entire matter, or, alternatively, it may attempt to anticipate the 
nature of its competitor's reactions. In order to avoid the 
problem of interdependency, we will assume that the home industry 
consists of either a monopoly, or in the instance of an oligopoly, 
the firms pursue a policy of joint profit maximisation. With 
regard to the relationship between the home firms and the foreign 
rivals, we will consider two alternative cases.
2*1 Home Firm..' is a Monopoly, Foreign Firms are Price Followers
Here, we assume that home and foreign firms produce homogeneous 
products. The dominant home firm seeks to maximise its profits 
subject to the constraints of import competition. Foreign suppliers 
behave as atomistic firms: they perceive their average revenue curve
in the home market to be perfectly elastic at each price and set their 
marginal cost equal to their price. In Figure (1) prices and tariffs 
are shown along the vertical axis, while output and imports are 
measured on the horizontal axis. DD* is the domestic demand curve for 
the commodity.
Initially, we will consider the case to be linear, the non-linear case 
will be explained later. In the absence of imports, DD* is also the 
average revenue curve facing the home firm.: MC is the marginal cost
curve for the domestic producer. SF is the supply curve of foreign 
firms. The average revenue curve for the home producer is now 
obtained by the horizontal differences between DD' and SF. The 
resulting curve is shown by HH', the corresponding marginal revenue 
curve is r r 1. Before the imposition of tariffs, the home firm produces 
OQq and sets the price at 0Po . Given the price, the foreign producers
-  1 2  -

sell the amount QoQy. Now consider an ad-valorem tariff of, say,
p p-j
ffl Per cent* The tariff shifts SF to S'F', and consequently the OPo
excess demand curve will shift upward to JJ*. Following the shift 
in the excess demand, the marginal revenue curve rr* will also shift 
upward to UU’. The profit maximising price for the home firm will now 
be OP 3  and at this price the home firm can increase its production to 
OQ 2 . Given this price (OP3 ), the foreign suppliers (behaving as atomistic 
firms) will lower their price (the tariff exclusive price) to OPf, and 
the quantity of imports will also be reduced to Q2 Q 3  , (Q0 Q 2  + Q 3 Ql less 
than its free trade level). In comparison with the free trade situation 
the foreign price is reduced by PQP f . The amount of duty collected by 
the government will be PfP^KL, against this is the loss of consumer surplus 
represented by the area PqP^N^M-^. Moreover, what is new is that the 
tariff increases the profit of the home firm by (P0 pdN 2 M 2  + WQ£ M 2 W 2 ) r and 
that this may, together with the effect of the "Terms of Trade", offset 
and even exceed the loss of consumer surplus. Thus we find that the tariff 
brings a net gain (loss) in welfare accordingly:
+ PfP0KoL < M 3N 3 M 2,
The results here are not surprising in view of the analyses of J. Bhagwati 
and V.K 0 Ramasawi (1963) and Johnson (1971) which argued that in the 
presence of domestic distortion tariffs may increase or decrease welfare. 
That is, free trade is not optimal, and thus tariffs as a second distorting 
factor may help the attainment of an optimum s i t u a t i o n ^  .
The diagram indicates the possibilities in which welfare increases or 
decreases. As can be seen, the welfare loss increases as price goes up, 
and the possibility of the welfare gain increases as output expands. In
(1) R 0 G 0 Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster (1956). "The General Theory of 
Second Best". Review of Economic Studies, Vol.24, p p ell-32.
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a linear case, price and output will both rise, but in non­
linear cases other outcomes are possible* For example, in a 
constant elasticity case (explained in Appendix A ) , where the 
elasticity of foreign supply equals the elasticity of home demand, 
the tariff will not affect the price, so the output will increase. 
However, there are other cases in which the non-linearity of 
foreign supply and domestic demand is accompanied by changeability 
in these price elasticities. In such a case as Finger (1973) has 
argued an upward shift of demand may coincide with a sufficiently 
large reduction of the elasticity ofNdemand, that the monopolist's 
marginal revenue curve shifts downward and it becomes profitable 
for the monopolist to further restrict its output or reduce its 
price.
2.2. Oligopolistic Market With Product Differentiation
In the previous model we assumed that home and foreign products were 
homogeneous - that was in keeping with the assumption of the standard 
theory of tariffs. However, this assumption seems at variance with 
the conditions in the U.K. case. Casual observations show that the 
competing imports are often differentiated from the home goods. It 
therefore seems desirable to relax the assumption of product 
homogeneuity and this will also allow us to distinguish between groups 
of consumers according to whether they consume home or foreign goods.
To simplify the analysis we will make the following assumption in 
addition to those which have already been imposed by the previous 
model.
(i) All imports consist of a single homogeneous product.
(ii) The C.I.F. price of import is independent of the home 
price.
-  15  -
The latter assumption enables us to avoid the problem of interdependent 
pricing discussion under oligopoly. This is justified if foreign firms" 
sales to the U.K. are a small proportion of their total sales. The price- 
quantity relationship for the home products and imports are shown in Fig.(2). 
Quantities produced and imported are shown on the orizontal axis; prices 
and tariffs are along the vertical axis. is the demand curve for home
products when the price of foreign products equal their C.I.F. price. Before 
the imposition of a tariff the marginal revenue curve interesects the marginal 
cost curve (MC) at Cty. Therefore, the price is set at °dpl and the quantity 
is . At this price the demand curve for foreign goods is shown by
F^F]_. As can be seen, the foreign suppliers sell the amount of OfNfy.
W1 W2Let us now suppose that a tariff of ■ per cent is imposed. The price of
imports rises to OfW 2 . This will reduce the imports of Of M 2 . There will
consequently be a loss of consumer surplus equal to t^WfTS. Of this, WfV^TR
will be offset by the collection of tariff duties by the government. The
( 1 )remaining segment TRS is a welfare loss for the country. The rise in
the import price will also shift the home firms1 demand curve to D 2 D 2 .
j
Those firms may now increase their output and/or increase their price in 
order to maintain maximum profits. The policy to pursue will depend on 
the consequent change in the price elasticity of the shifted demand curve.
Initially, we can assume that the elasticity is not affected by the 
shift of the curve. Considering firms do not increase their price,
(1) The assumption of import prices being independent of home prices
enables us to abstract from the terms-of-trade effect. Relaxation 
of this assumption will necessitate the inclusion of the effect of 
the terms-of-trade in our analysis: VtyW^TR will be the lower bound
of the. government revenue, while VtyV^TS will be the upper bound of 
the loss of consumer surplus to the consumers of foreign goods.
-  1 6  -
(a) (b)
Price of
Home
Products
Price of
Foreign
Goods
Domestic Output Imports
FIGURE 2
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but' merely increase their output. This means that consumers who
had bought the home products before the tariff will not suffer any 
loss of welfare. The firms' profit will increase by 
indicating a welfare gain for the country. Thus the net welfare 
change will be a gain or loss according to >< TRS.
We will now allow for the possibility that the tariff induces an 
increase in the price of the home producers as well as in their 
output. Let the price rise to 0dP 2* increase the profit will
now be C^C 2 H^H 2 +P-j/p2 A 3 H 3 ~C^H 2 H 2 C 2 • total loss of consumer
surplus is suffered by consumers of home produced goods plus
W i W 2TS suffered by consumers of foreign produced goods. The net 
welfare effects will, therefore, be a gain or a loss according to 
^ l ^ l ^ ^  ><7^ 2 ^ 3  + Clearly, the likelihood of a welfare gain
(loss) is smaller (greater) than that in the previous case where the 
home price was not affected by the tariff. Thus, as in the 
homogeneous products model, we can state that the possibility of a 
welfare loss increases the greater the increase in the home firm's 
price and the smaller the increase in its output.
Up until now we have assumed that home producers perceive their 
demand curve as smooth, continuous and downward sloping. However, 
it is interesting to note that the same results will be obtained under 
an alternative model, namely the kinked demand curve model.
The kinked demand curve argument is that a firm in an oligopolistic 
setting views its average revenue curve as consisting of two parts.
-  1 8  -
The firm believes that its rivals have asymetric response to price 
changes. It believes that they will quickly match its own price 
reductions, but only hesitantly and incompletely (if at all) follow 
its price increases. This pattern of expected behaviour produces 
a kink in the perceived demand curve facing the oligopolist. The 
argument is presented with the use of Figure (3). Output is shown 
on the horizontal axis, while price is on the vertical axis. 
is the perceived demand curve by the individual firm, while the 
curve shows the amount of demand going to a firm when all firms are 
charging the same price.
As the average revenue curve is kinked at point K , the associated 
marginal recenue curve will be discontinuous below this point. 
Consequently there is a "gap" between the two segments (r-Lri' r ] r-[) 
of the marginal revenue. As Stigler (1947) argues, the length of 
the discontinuity in marginal revenue is proportional to the 
differences between the slopes of the demand curve on the two sides 
of the kink. He also states that the discontinuity will be larger 
the more similar the products, because customers will shift more rapidly 
to the low-price firms. The marginal cost curve is shown by MC.
If the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue curve in 
either of the two segments, the price and the output will be determined 
in accordance with the profit-maximisation conditions. However if 
the cost curve cuts the discontinuous part of the marginal revenue 
curve the price-output combination will coincide with the kink at K.
Now let us turn to the effect of trade and tariffs. To simplify the 
analysis we hold to the assumptions set out for the previous model.
P r ic e
FIGURE 3
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Figure (4a) shows the output of the home firms, while (4b) shows
imports. d^fflD^ is the kinked demand curve for the home products,
which is regarded as the average revenue curve by home producers.
The lower part of the- kinked demand curve (fflffl) expresses the
behaviour of all firms (foreign and domestic) in the market. Thus
a price change in the lower part of the curve will stimulate 
retaliatory reactions of foreign films, while in the upper part 
(d^  ffl) a price rise will not necessarily be copied. The relevant
i i
marginal revenue curves are fflffl ancl fflffl* MC xs the marginal cost
curve. FF is the demand curve for imports. Before the imposition
of a tariff the kink is at price (fflffl* Home firms produce 0 Q-, and
W1 W2 °  'total imports are 0 A -  Now supposing a tariff of Q ™ per cent
f  1
is imposed. The price of imports rises to 0_Wn and the demand for
± 2
imports falls to fflffl . The result is a loss of VfflfflTS in the 
consumer surplus of those who consumed foreign goods. Of this amount 
W^fflTR will be offset by the collection of tariff duties by the 
government. The remaining segment TRS is a welfare loss for the 
country. This loss should be set against any losses or gains obtained 
from the induced changes in the price and/or the output of home firms.
The increase in the price of imported goods results in an increase in 
the demand for home produced goods. This will shift the two parts of 
the kinked demand to a new position. The effect on price and/or 
output of the home producers will therefore depend on how these shifts 
come about, or in other words, where the new kink is set up. Initially,
we assume that the kink shifts in such a way that home price remains
The a n a l y s i s  i s  p r e s e n t e d  w it h  th e  h e lp  o f  F ig u r e s  (4 a ) and (_4b) .
-  2 1  -
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to 0-0 . Since the cost is assumed to be constant, the result will d 2
be an increase in the profits of home firms, by an amount CyKlK2C2'
The net welfare effect will be a gain or a loss according to ;
C1 K 1 K 2C 2 >< TOS
However, the kink may shift to such a position that the expansion of 
output is accompanied by a price.increase. This is shown on the 
Figure when the kink is at K . The increase in the profit will now
be C2.K1K2C 2 + ^ LP2K 3Z ~~ ZK2C2C 3* <I^le total loss °f the consumer
surplus i s E L,P2 K 3 K 2  ^ suffered by consumers of home produced goods, plus 
^ l ^ T S  suffere(3 by consumers of foreign produced goods. The net 
welfare effect will therefore be a gain or loss according to 
C 1K1ZC3 >< TRS + ZiyK .
As can be observed, a rise in the home price brings an additional loss 
of consumer surplus (suffered by those who consume home products) and 
reduces the level of domestic output. It is therefore justified to 
state that the larger the increase in the home price, the larger the 
loss of consumer surplus and the smaller the level of home products.
In other words, the likelihood of a welfare loss will be smaller 
(greater) the smaller (greater) the increase in the home price. The 
same conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the former model.
2.3 Summary and Conclusions
In our first model we have shown that in a market where products are 
homogeneous and foreign firms take the price set by the domestic
u n ch a n g e d . The o u t p u t  o f  th e  home p r o d u c e r s  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e
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monopoly, the imposition of tariffs may increase the profits of home 
firms as well as reducing the consumer surplus. The increase in the 
profit occurs through an increase in the price or/and an expansion in 
the firm's output. The derived conclusion seems consistent with 
those found by J. Bhagwati and V.K. Ramasawi (1963) and H. Johnson 
(1971) that tariffs in the presence of domestic distortion may increase 
or decrease welfare.
\
In our second model, we relaxed the assumption of product homogenuity. 
Correspondingly, consumers were divided into two groups according to 
whether they preferred home or foreign goods. As in the homogeneous 
product case, price and/or output could both be affected by the tariff. 
The analysis of the model indicated that welfare gain (loss) would be 
smaller (greater) if the home price was not affected by the tariff. 
Finally, we showed that the same conclusion could be reached from a 
third model, namely that involving the kinked demand curve.
In brief, the analysis of our three models showed that the imposition 
of a tariff may generate either a welfare gain or a loss. The 
welfare gain is the result of the impact of tariff on the profits of 
the home firms. The increase in the prof its occur through either an 
expansion of the home firms1 output or an increase in their price or 
a combination of both. Furthermore, the analyses showed that the 
likelihood of a gain (loss) is smaller (greater) if the price of 
domestic firms is affected by the tariff.
Our main purpose now is to use the above analysis to estimate the 
welfare effect of tariffs in the United Kingdom. To do this we will
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need to run some econometric tests in order to examine the effects 
of tariff and import-competition on the prices and output of home 
firms. But before carrying out such tests we will review the 
empirical work undertaken in the field by other economists.
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CHAPTER 3
SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The theoretical analysis of the previous chapter indicated that in 
an oligopolistic market tariffs may either increase or decrease home 
welfare depending on the effects of the tariffs on the price and 
output of domestic firms. This chapter surveys the relevant economic 
literature to discover what the empirical evidence indicate about the 
effects of tariffs and import competition.
Strictly speaking, the empirical literature is not directly concerned 
with the effect on home price. However there are a considerable 
number of investigations into the effects on the price-cost margin. 
Since protection is unlikely to have any systematic effect on the 
firm's costs, the results for the price-cost margins may be considered 
as indicative of the effects on home prices.
3.1 ’import Competition, Domestic Market Structure, and price-cosc margin:
Economic theory suggests that the structural feature of an industry 
influences the performance - price, output, and profits - of the firms 
in the industry. During the last three decades several empirical 
studies have examined the relationship between the market structure 
and profitability. Initially, these investigations were concerned 
only with the closed economy, indicating that profitability is 
influenced only by the structure of the domestic market. More recent 
studies have also incorporated foreign competition and protection as 
contributory factors.. Here we will primarily survey the latter type 
of studies.
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3 . 1 . 1 .  Im p o rt C o m p e tit io n  and P r i c e -C o s t 'M a r g i n
Import competition may reduce the market power of the dominant firms 
in a given industry. In effect, this represents entry by foreign 
competitors and therefore distorts domestic seller concentration.
The effect of foreign entry on home firms1 prices and consequently 
on their price-cost margins to a great extent depends on the existing 
product differentiation between home and foreign goods. In a 
situation that imported and domestic products are homogeneous, a 
substantial amount of imports or the threat thereof may encourage 
domestic firms to set import-entry forestalling prices approaching 
competitive prices. This view was first advocated by Esposito and 
Esposito (1971). The implication of this view is that imports have 
a negative impact on the price-cost margin of import competing 
industries.
In the presence of product differentiation the behaviour of competitive 
import prices may have no significant effect on the price of 
domestically produced manufacturers. This view is backed by the 
empirical findings of Coutts, Godley, and Nordhaus (1978). However 
the effect of foreign entry on home firms' concentration may 
contribute to a reduction in the home firms' profitability.
In brief, if import competition is believed to have a negative effect 
on the home firms' profitability, tariffs will conversely be expected 
to exert a positive effect on price-cost margins. We are, therefore, 
faced with a choice of using either imports or tariffs as a measure of
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t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  c o m p e t i t io n .
There is further the question of which type of tariff rates can most 
suitably be employed. Some economists, like Mcfetridge (1973) and 
Hitiris (1978), advocated the choice of effective tariff rates in 
preference to the nominal tariff rates. The argument is, that 
tariffs simultaneously provide subsidies to the domestic production 
of the goods on which they are levied, and impose taxes on the 
domestic goods which are inputs. Thus, a tariff on inputs used in 
the import competing industries constitutes a subsidy on imports. 
Effective protective rates emphasize the importance of tariffs, 
taxes and subsidies, on the final products and intermediate inputs. 
They are therefore a measure of the afforded degree of protection 
most relevant for the study of profits.
The opposing views are based on the fact that the effective tariff 
rate is usually calculated under conditions of perfect competition, 
and therefore cannot be an appropriate measure, used in a study based 
on the conditions of an oligopolistic market.
3.1.2. Concentration and Price-Cost Margin
■ Given the cost conditions of the firms and the market demand, we 
expect that prices will be higher under conditions of monopoly than 
under conditions of competitions. In an oligopolistic situation 
we expect to observe a positive relationship between industry price 
and the degree of seller concentration. The reason for expecting 
such a positive relationship is that the higher the level of seller
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concentration, the more likely it is that the dominant firms will be 
able to collude, tacitly or expressly, to raise prices above the 
long-run average cost.
Ihe theoretical relationship between the market power of firms and 
the degree of concentration has been shown by T.R. Saving (1970).
He made use of a model in which an industry consists of a few large 
firms that function as a cartel and a large number of smaller firms. 
The operating assumption is that the dominant firms set the price 
and allow the smaller firms to sell at that price. Thus the latter 
firms behave as atomistic firms in perfect competition. Let there 
be (n) minor firms and (K) dominant firms. Market demand (D) is a 
function of the market price (P).
The quantity supplied by the (n) smaller firms is a function of
As the market is cleared at all times, the demand function for the 
large firms is the difference between (1) and (2) .
Now assuming that f and g are continuously differentiable, we have :
D = f(P) (1).
the price (P) .
Sn g (P ) (.2)
D
K f(P) - g(P) (3)
K f' (P) - g T (P) (4)dP
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and s o  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f a c i n g  l a r g e  f i r m s  i s  :
\
f (P)
K
g(P)
K
(5)
Where n and ri are respectively the demand elasticities for the K D
large firms and for the market, and is the supply elasticity for 
the smaller firms.
Equation (5) may be related to L e m e r ' s  (1933) measure of monopoly 
power. L e m e r ' s  measure is defined as :
P-MC.K
K (6)
Where A is the K firms L e m e r  index and MC is the joint marginal K K
cost for the K largest firms. If we assume that joint profits are 
maximised at all times, (6) becomes :
P-P 1-f
K (7)'K
Since the R.H.S. of (7) is simply the negative invers of (5), the 
Lerner's index may be written as :
K f (P)
K
!g(P)
i DK
E
(8)
Defining the concentration ratio as the percentage of industry sales 
accounted for by the K firms ffl = ° K , equation (8) can now be expressed
D
in terms of C (industry concentration ratio). K
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Therefore given the framework of the dominant firms’ model, the 
degree of monopoly power is positively related to the concentration 
ratio.
Barriers to Entry and Price-Cost Margin
Concentration itself may be a parameter. In fact it may be 
influenced by barriers to entry to the industry. Established firms 
may create entry barriers to deter new-comers to the industry. These 
barriers may directly and indirectly enable established firms to earn 
excess profits. As Bain (1956) suggested the conditions of entry 
may have a significant influence on the pricing behaviour of existing 
firms. Given significant barriers the price can exceed the minimum 
long-run average cost.
Entry barriers arise from the following sources : scale economies,
product differentiation, absolute cost advantages, and capital 
requirements.
(a) Scale Economies :
Production and distribution costs per unit of output may 
decline as the scale of plant or firm is expanded. The 
smallest scale of operation at which a plant or firm may 
achieve the lowest attainable unit cost is referred to 
as the minimum optimal scale of the plant or the firm.
An entrant to industries where the minimum optimal scale
is significantly large would anticipate higher than 
minimum attainable costs (due to suboptimal scale).
This is likely to deter entry. This entry-barrier 
may enable the established firms to raise their prices 
at least somewhat above their minimum attainable 
average costs without attracting entry. Thus 
relatively large minimum optimal scales may make for 
high concentration and high margin.
(b) Product Pi fferentiation Advantages :
Product differentiation is propagated by differences 
in the design or quality of competing products and by 
the sales and advertising efforts of sellers. Buyers 
may have a preference for the products of established 
firms as compared with the products of new entrants.
This may itself be a source of barriers to entry.
Economic theory suggests that as a consequence of 
product differentiation, the seller gains some independent 
jurisdiction over his price, relative to the price of his 
rivals, which he would not have if the competing products 
were part of a single homogeneous, standardised commodity. 
Thus, firms producing such products may raise their prices 
somewhat above those of their rivals without losing all of 
the customers.
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(c) Absolute Cost Advantages ;
Established firms may also have an absolute cost 
advantage over potential firms. The long-run 
average cost curve of the new entrant (showing the 
relation of the scale of operation to unit costs of 
a firm) would then lie above that for the established 
firms. The sources of absolute cost advantages are 
as follows :
(i) Established firms may control superior 
production techniques.
(ii) There may be imperfections in the markets 
for productive factors purchased by all 
firms which permit established firms to 
employ such factors at relatively lower 
prices.
(iii) Strategic factor supplies; established 
firms may have control over factors such 
as new materials.
(d) Capital Requirements :
Capital costs are fixed costs which are incurred regardless 
of the level of output. These costs differ between 
industries. High capital requirements thu.s insulate 
existing firms from the potential competition of new-comers. 
We may expect capital intensive industries to make for 
higher concentration and higher price-cost margins.
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Here we report the findings- of eight studies which have examined 
the relationship between price-cost margin (or profit margin) and 
market structural factors in an open economy.
These are: G. Esposito and F. Esposito (1971); D.C. McFetridge (1973); 
J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974); H. Bloch (1974); E* Pagoulatos and 
R. Sorensen (1976); P.E. Hart and E. Morgan (1977); J.C.H. Jones,
L. Laudadio, and KU Percy (1977); and T. Hitiris (1978).
Most of the above studies employed multi-variate regression analysis 
in order to explain the relationship in question. However,
E.Pagoulatos and R. Sorensen (1976) used joint generalised least 
s q u a r e s ^  in addition to multi-variate regression analysis in their 
investigation.
In general, an industry’s profit ratio is measured.by one of the two 
following fractions :
3 . 1 . 4 .  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  E m p i r i c a l  F i n d i n g s
(1) A. Zeller (1962). "An efficient method of estimating seemingly 
unrelated regressions and tests for aggregations bias",
Journal of the American Statistical Association, p . 548-68
A. Zeller (1963). "Estimate for seemingly unrelated regression 
equations, some exact finite results". Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, o.977-92
H.Theil, (1971). Principles of Econometrics, New York,
John Wiley and Sons Inc. p. 294-303
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( T o t a l  I n d u s t r y ( P a y r o l l  + D e p r e c i a t i o n  + O t h e r
P r i c e - c o s t Sales)■ Fixed and Variable Costs)
Margin
Total Industry Sales
Profit (Net Output)
(Payroll + Depreciation + Other 
_________ Variable Costs)
Margin
Net Output
However in some of the above-mentioned studies, the adopted measures 
were slightly different from those given above. L. Esposito and
F. Esposito (1971) took profit (after tax) as a percentage of net 
worth (instead of total sales) to measure profit ratio. E. Pagoulatos 
and R. Sorensen (1976) defined price-cost margin as the net return 
(valued added - payroll - depreciation) expressed as a percentage of 
industry sales. J. Jones, L. Laudadio, and M. Percy (1977) took the 
ratio of profits plus interest to total assets in order to measure 
industry profit ratio.
The empirical results of the above-mentioned studies are summarised 
as follows :
Import Competition or Trade Protection
The effect of foreign competition bn price-cost margin has been 
tested either by using the import/sales ratio or the tariff rates.
Esposito and Esposito (1971), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974)., Pagoulatos 
and Sorensen (1976), and J. Jo'nes, L. Laudadio and M. Percy (1977) 
found the import-sales ratio had a significant negative effect on 
industry price-cost margins. Though Hart and Morgan (1977) found
3 5
l e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e s u l t s .
McFetridge (1973) seems to have been the first who investigated the 
effect of tariff protection. Using the effective rate as a measure 
of protection, he failed to find any significant effect on the profit 
margin. On the other hand, T. Hitiris (1978) who also used the 
effective rate measure, found a highly significant relationship with 
the price-cost margins. H. Bloch (1974) was concerned to see whether' 
the effects of tariffs were interdependent with those of concentration.
He found that the interdependence is such that the price-cost margin 
tends to be higher when tariffs and concentration are both high, but 
high tariffs and low concentration have no significant influence on 
the margins.
Concentration:
Overall, concentration showed a positive, consistent, and statistically 
significant relationship with price-cost margin in almost all the 
studies concerned. There is, however, some evidence of nultico.llinearity 
between concentration ratio and the capital intensity factor. The 
other important outcome of these studies is the appearance of less 
significant results for small economies. This is shown in the 
empirical findings of E. Pagoulatos and R. Sorensen (1976). The 
study in part tries to explain the relationship between price-cost 
margin and concentration for five EEC countries (France, Italy,
Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium). The results of the study 
suggest that domestic industry concentration does not necessarily 
reflect the degree of monopoly power in small relatively "open" 
economies.
(1976) , and T. Hitiris (.1978) , the other aforementioned studies
included scale economies in their analyses in order to explain the
changes in price-cost margins. L. Esposito and F. Esposito (1971)
took the ratio of average plant size to total industry output as a
(1)measure of scale economies . Average plant size was calculated
for the largest plants supplying apprximately fifty per cent of the
industry. D„ McFetridge (1973) took the percentage of industry
shipments accounted for by the largest four establishments as a
measure of scale economies. J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974) took the
size of the "mid-point” plant as a percentage of industry net
(2)output to measure scale economies . Size is determined by 
employment. The same technique was employed by Jones, Laudadio, 
and Percy (1977) . However, due to data constraints there was a 
slight difference in their calculation of the average plant size 
for Canada and America. The authors took the average plant size 
of the largest establishments accounting for 50 per cent and 80 
per cent of the industry output for the U.S.A. and Canada respectively. 
These were expressed as percentages of industry output. Hart and 
Morgan (1977) took the medium size of enterprise by employment as a 
measure of scale economies.
B a r r i e r s  t o  E n t r y
W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  H. B l o c h  ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  E .  P a g o u l a t o s  a n d  R . S o r e n s e n
(1) Camanor and Wilson (1967) were the first who used this method
(.2) L. Weiss (1963) was the first one who employed this method
to estimate "minimum optimal scale".
Esposito and Esposito (1971). collected varying results. The 
relationship between scale economies and price-cost margin was 
negative and significant for producer good industries but not for 
the consumer good industries. McFetridge (1973) and Hart and 
Morgan (1977) found insignificant relationship between scale 
economies and price-cost margin. Jones, Laudadio and Percy (1977) 
found a positive and significant relationship for consumer good 
industries only for the American sample. For other samples the 
results were insignificant. Since there was evidence of 
multicollinearity between scale economies and concentration ratio, 
the authors regarded their results with caution. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi 
(19.74) found the relation very significant.
Product differentiation is measured as the percentage of advertising 
expenditure on total industry sales. All of the above-mentioned 
studies, with the exception of Hitiris (1978) found support for the 
hypothesis and there is a positive relationship between industry's 
price-cost margin and its advertising intensity.
Capital requirement, often expressed as the ratio of an industry's 
capital assets on sales, has also.been used in some of the studies 
e.g. Esposito and Esposito (1971), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974),
Jones, Laudadio and Percy (1977) and Hart and Morgan (1977). Ifost 
of these studies found a statistically significant relationship with 
the price-cost margin. The interpretation of this result, however, 
is problematical, because of evidence of multicollinearity between 
this factor and the concentration ratio.
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In assessing the effects of protection on the output of a firm, the 
measurement of output appears as a problem. Ideally, one would 
like to employ a physical measure in quantifying the real change in 
output. But such a measure has little practical use in a study 
concerned with a group of commodities. The alternative is to either 
use the money value of output (total sales) or an input factor 
related to output, such as the level of employment or capital.
Neither of the above measures (for the following reasons) can 
adequately express the real change in output. The price of a 
product may change and consequently increase the total revenues, but 
such an increase could have also occurred if the level of output had 
risen. Therefore, it is difficult to specify the reason for which 
the value of output has risen. One can directly relate employment . 
to output, but a change in employment can also be due to changes in 
factors like productivity or capital intensity, and not necessarily 
to the change in output.
However, in economic literature one does not often come across 
empirical studies which investigate the effect of protection on 
industries1 output. Thus this section surveys some relevant 
economic literature to observe the impact of protection on employment. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of protection on employment may 
be classified into two groups. The first group considers the effect 
of protection on employment, as the outcome of a direct relationship 
between the number of job losses, and the import/output or tariff 
ratio. From this group of studies we will mention three pieces of
3 . 2 .  P r o t e c t i o n  a n d  E m p lo y m e n t
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work, two conducted by the International Labour Office (ILO) and 
one by  the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).
In the second type of studies, employment is an endogenous variable 
which may be related to international trade, labour productivity, 
consumption, and various other factors. From this group two recent 
studies will be mentioned.
The first ILO study (1968) attempted to assess the number of 
employment opportunities lost, as the result of increasing imports 
from developing countries. The study treated the imports of 
manufacturers and semi-manufacturers from developing countries as 
competitors of the product of domestic manufacturers in the 
developed countries. This was undertaken for the period 1961-65 
and dealt with eight selected groups of industrial products in the 
three major industrial areas, namely North America, the EEC, and 
the EFTA. The study considered the direct employment effects 
only; the indirect effects from other inter-industry relations 
were not taken into account. Its procedure assumed that, during 
the period under study, everything else but imports and employment 
remained unchanged.
The results suggest a displacement of less than 0.2% of the total 
manufacturing employment in each industrial area.
The second study of the ILO (.1971). aimed at estimating the effect 
of removal, or reduction of trade barriers (against imports of
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manufacturers of developing countries) on employment in the 
developed countries. These estimates were based on Professor 
Balassa's (1968) study of the probable increase in imports of 
manufactures from developing countries to the U.S.A., the U.K., 
the EEC, and the EFTA. He forecasted the increase in imports' due 
to the elimination of tariffs. The ILO study showed that the 
Kennedy round had only negligible effects. For the hypothetical 
case of the total elimination of tariffs, the results were rather 
interesting. For example, in the U.S.A. the decrease in employment 
caused by the increased importation of manufactures from developing 
countries, amounted to less than 0.16% of the total manufacturing 
employment. The results for the U.K., EEC, and EFTA, were a decrease 
of 0.027%, 0.083%, and 0.071% respectively in the total employment 
of the manufacturing industries.
A similar approach was taken in the study by J. Little, T. Scitovski, 
and M. Scott (1970) for the OECD Development Centre. The authors 
attempted to measure the level of unemployment in the OECD countries, 
which would result from a hypothetical expansion in imports of 
manufactures from the developing countries. The results showed a 
loss of 750 thousand jobs in these countries. The lost jobs 
consisted of a reduction of 0.5% and 4.9% in the employment of the 
manufacturing sectors in the U.S.A. and the U.K. together with EEC 
countries, respectively.
/
In a more recent study E.E. Learner, R.M. S t e m  and C.F. Boun (1977) 
took a different approach to study the effect of foreign competition 
on manufacturing employment in the industrial countries. They
-  4 1  -
assumed that the level of employment in an industry can be explained 
partly by a set of "resource variables" and partly by a set of 
"resistance factors". The "resource variables", such as factor 
endowments, determine the special productive capacities of the 
country, while the "resistance factors", such as tariffs and 
transportation costs, determine the country's access to international 
markets. The authors general hypothesis was that, countries 
economise on their relatively scarce resources. Thus relative 
scarcity of resources and openness of markets determine the 
allocation of production across industries. Their model is 
specified as follows :
| n  Q = a  + £X + ( Y + A x ) / ( 1  + t )
Where Q = output, X = level of resource variables, and t =  a 
measure of tariff,
the authors argued that the relationships involving resource levels, 
tariffs, and output can also be applied to factor inputs. Thus 
they estimated the above equation with a measure of employment as 
the dependent variable. The model was tested with reference to 20 
industries in each of the world's 18 major industrial countries.
They used tariffs from the post Kennedy Round (1972) as a measure of 
the degree of openness.
The results were the estimated tariff elasticities with, respect to 
employment shares for each industry in the 18 countries. For a 
number of industries the signs- were incorrect. However, these
incorrect signs did not appear to be consistent in all countries.
The exceptions to this were leather products, pottery, electrical 
machinery, and transport equipment. The results had the correct 
signs (positive) for the remaining industries, which indicated a 
positive relationship between tariffs and employment.
V. Cable (1978) examined the effect on unemployment in the U.K. 
industries, which resulted from the increased competition of LDC's 
imports. The author tried to decompose employment changes and to 
quantify the separate influences of trade flows as well as the
changes in other factors. This decomposition rests on the use of
two identities :
0 = C + X - M  (1)
P ■ |  (2)
Where 0 = output., C = domestic consumption, X = exports, M = imports, 
P = productivity of labour, defined as output per man year, and 
E = employment.
Substituting (2) into (1) and differentiating with respect to time, 
gives an expression for the change of employment, which Cable 
approximated by :
- E. . = — ^—  (C - c. _ ) + — —  (X - X  ,) t t-1 P. , ( t t-1) P. . t t-1)t-1 t-1
: pt iCM - M . ) - E , -------i j( t t-1) t 1 t-i )
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The four terms on the right-hand side represent the employment 
changes due to a shift in domestic consumption, exports, imports, 
and productivity, respectively. The four factors are assumed
to be independent of each other. The model was tested for 34
three digit SIC industry groups for the period 1970-75. These 
industries are selected on the criteria that the LDC's share of 
U.K. consumption is at least 2%.
In over half of the cases considered, the employment effect of 
LDC trade was positive. But only in few cases the effects were 
of significance. In the aggregate estimates, the potential change 
in employment, as a result of trade with the rest of the world, was 
much higher than that with the LDC's.
The aim of the above studies has primarily been to show that the 
effect of the LDC's import competition on the industrialised 
countries' employment is less significant than the effects of other 
contributory factors. This, however, is not the concern of our 
study, but it nevertheless helps us to understand that there is a 
positive relationship between tariff rates and the industries' level 
of employment.
In brief, the survey provided us with enough evidence to indicate a 
positive relationship between trade protection and the industry profit 
and output. The same effects were suggested in our second theoretical 
model in the previous chapter. The next step is to test the hypothesis 
econometrically. This will be undertaken in the next chapter.
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IMPORT COMPETITION, PROTECTION, PRICE-COST 
MARGINS AND OUTPUT OF U.K. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
This Chapter aims to quantify the effects of import competition and 
protection on the price-cost margins and output of the United Kingdom 
manufacturing industries. This analysis will cover each of the years 
1963 and 1968. The methodology used builds upon those of the earlier 
studies discussed in Chapter 3.
4.1 The Models ;
The relationship between price-cost margins, output and the 
independent variables will be estimated with the following 
equations :
H = a + a nCR + a„CLR + a_GD + a.AR + a_DIC o i 2 3 4 5
V = b + b.CR + b^ODI + b DIC o 1 2 3
where II is the price-cost margin, V  is the money value of
output produced and consumed in U.K., CR is the seller
concentration, CLR is the capital intensity, GD is the growth
of demand, AR is the advertising intensity, DIC is the degree
of import competition (or alternatively tariff protection),
and ODI is the correction for the industry size (imports of
OECD countries) , while a  a_ and b  b. are theo . 5  o 3
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables. The 
tests will be undertaken with a sample of 40 non-food 
manufacturing industries; the selection of the sample was
CHAPTER 4
based mainly on the availability of data"1". The reasons for 
limiting the analysis to the non-food industries are two-fold. 
Ideally, the tests should incorporate a measure of the price 
elasticity, of demand for each industry, since the domestic 
response to foreign competition may depend on the elasticities. 
Unfortunately, lack of systematic information on elasticities 
makes this rather difficult. However, we do know that food 
industries have comparatively lower price elasticities than 
non-food industries and consequently a sample including both 
groups may give misleading results. The exclusion of food 
industries reduces the problem. The second reason for excluding 
food industries was that our chosen source of tariff (Kitchin, 1975) 
does not provide any figures for food industries, although the 
required tariff rates could have been obtained from other sources. 
This however could cause inconsistencies and it seemed desirable 
not to resort to this solution.
4.2 The Variables and Data :
The variables used in the regression analysis are defined as 
follows. The sources of data are described in Appendix C.
Y
Price-Cost Margin
Price-cost margin is defined as the percentage of gross returns 
(before tax) on the sales of the industry. It can be formulated
1 Nationalised and government owned industries were excluded
because these industries may follow somewhat different pricing 
policies from the privately owned industries.
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(I + GTP + TSP) - (W + SA)
Price-cost margin = --------------------------------
v S
where I = factor income, GTP = gross trading profits of private 
companies, TSP = total trading surplus of.public corporations,
W = wages and salaries, SA = stock appreciation and S = total sales 
of the industry.
Output
It would be desirable to use a quantitative measure of output.
However data for such a measure is not readily available in the 
published sources. The other problem is that the quantitiative 
measures are unlikely to be uniform in a study concerned with a group 
of industries. We, therefore, had the choice of measuring the output 
by its money value in either gross or net terms. Gross output, however, 
appeared to be the b e t t e r .ch o i c e . . Because (as explained on page 51) our 
corrective measure for the industry size is the imports of the OECD. 
Consequently, we decided to measure industry output by the money value 
of the gross domestic output consumed at home.
Seller concentration
Among the various measures for seller concentration the Herfindahl 
(1950), and the n-firm concentration ratios are best known. The 
Herfindahl measure is designed to incorporate information on the 
market share of all firms'*'. It can therefore be regarded as a 
weighted average, where the weights used are the firms' shares.
In the n-firms ra t i o s , n most frequently takes on the value of
1 Herfindahl index (H) is defined as follows •
n ?
H = £  S i  
i = 1
where Si is the share of the ith firms and there are n firms in the 
industry.
a s  f o l l o w s  :
-  4 7  -
The practical choice of the measure of concentration is usually 
determined by the nature of the data available. For the 
present study the most readily available measure is the share 
of the five enterprises with the largest sales on total industry 
s ales.
Capital intensity
Capital intensity is ideally measured by the ratio of capital
assets to total employment. The problem in calculating such
ratios for U.K. industries is that data on capital assets are
available only for the "quoted" companies. Because of this we
decided to compile a proxy measure by using instead the data on
capital expenditures. This procedure may be justified on the
grounds that there may be a close relationship between capital
1expenditure and capital assets . Using the capital expenditure 
data we estimated a proxy measure of capital intensity for each 
industry; these rates are the capital/labour ratios.
3  t o  5 ,  t h o u g h  v a l u e s  o f  8 ,  1 2  a n d  2 0  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n  u s e d .
1 The estimated relationships between the "quoted" companies
capital assets (F )and their corresponding capital expenditure 
(C) for 1963 and 1968 are as follows :
1963 F = 124.01 + 10.84 C
(6.15) R = 0 . 7 2  and corrected R = 0 . 7 0
1968 F = 120.18 + 9.98 C 2
(4.83) R = 0 . 6 1  and corrected R = 0 . 5 8
t-values are in parentheses
Proxy variables for capital intensity have been used in all 
previous studies of the U.K. industries. We can for example 
mention Holterman, S.E. (1973), Khalilzadeh Shirazi, J. (1974) 
and H i t i r i s , T. (1978).
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The rate of growth of demand should, ceteris paribus, positively 
affect industry price-cost margins through increases in market prices, 
and the possible relaxation of competitive pressures. This effect 
is ideally expressed by the ex-ante shift of demand schedule. As lack 
of information inhibited the use of such a measure, we employed instead 
the ex-post change in the value of industry sales. This is calculated 
by the annual rates of growth of sales (at current prices) between 1958 
and 1963, and between 1963 and 1968. These served as proxies for the 
growth of demand in the two periods under consideration.
Advertising Intensity
Advertising by the established firms can forestall the entry of new 
firms by influencing their cost conditions. In other words the new 
entrants would have to bear the high costs of advertising in order 
to achieve a desired level of sales. . Furthermore, advertising can 
create brand loyalty and so discourages the entry of new competitors. 
Thus advertising b y  differentiating products, acts as a barrier to 
entry and the relationship between advertising and profitability 
is expected to be positive, reflecting the relationship between 
product differentiation and profitability. In this study, advertising 
intensity is measured by the ratio of advertising expenditures over 
industries’ total sales.
Foreign competition
It is generally understood that free trade increases the competition 
between foreign and domestic producers, while protection has the 
opposite effect. This suggests that our analysis may use a measure 
of either import competition or of tariff protection. But it may 
also be interesting to employ each in turn. The intensity of import
G r o w th  o f  D em and
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competition may be measured by the ratio of total competing 
imports to the home consumption of that commodity which is 
produced domestically.
Tariff protection is measured here by the nominal tariff rates.
The reasons for using nominal rates in preference to the 
effective rates was discussed in Chapter 3: briefly, since the
effective protection concept holds only under conditions of 
perfect competition in the home market, the effective rates are 
unsuitable for studies of price-cost margins in oligopolistic 
m a r k e t s . The use of tariff rates involves a practical problem.
As the statistical analysis is at the industry level and as the 
original tariff data relates to commodities (or commodity groups) 
a choice had to be made between using unweighted or weighted 
averages of the original data. The weighted averages may use 
either imports or homeproduction as weights. However as those 
variables may themselves be influenced by the tariff the weighted 
average may have a- systematic bias. On the other hand, the use 
of unweighted rates has its own shortcoming in that, unweighted 
averages may depend on the amount of detail in the original tariff 
schedule, though unlike the weighted average these are unlikely to 
have a systematic bias. For the present study we made a pragmatic 
decision, and employed weighted nominal tariff rates, as they are 
readily available.
Correction for the industry size
Some industries are greater than others. This may be due to 
reasons other than differences in the industries' concentration or 
in their import intensities. One important reason could be the
-  5 o  -
differences in the consumption of different commodities. It thus 
seemed appropriate to take a corrective measure to explain the 
differences in the consumption of various chosen commodities.
Practical obstacles prevented us from choosing this corrective 
measure on the basis of U.K. consumption of these commodities. This 
is because the dependent variable in our model is the industry's sales 
in the U.K. An alternative would have been a measure of consumption 
from other western countries on the grounds that the pattern of 
consumption in those countries is likely to be similar to that in the 
U.K. In search for the best obtainable measure we decided to employ 
the imports of OECD countries as proxies for the consumption of the 
chosen commodities in these countries. This decision is however based 
on the assumption that the demand functions are similar for the U.K. 
and for the other OECD countries.
OECD imports are exclusive of U.K. and Japan's imports. The reasons 
for this are :
(i) to include the U.K. imports may give rise to certain biases;
(ii) Japan was not a member of OECD in 1963 and was excluded in 
an attempt to keep the member groups consistent.
4.3 Statistical R e s ults:
We employed OLS (ordinary least square) multivariate regression 
analysis to examine the effect of the market structure factors on 
industry price-cost margins and output. The regressions were tried 
in the linear and log-linear forms. The results for the former 
were more significant and consistent and therefore only these results 
are reported.
-  5 1  -
Correlation coefficients between the independent variables were 
examined for 1963 and 1968. The results are presented in 
Table 1.
Using Fisher's Z transformation we tested the null hypotheses'*', 
that the correlation coefficients at the population level are 
equal to zero. The test showed little correlation between the 
variables excpet for those between concentration and capital 
intensity, growth of demand and capital intensity and between 
tariff rates and import competition.
The high correlation between seller concentration and capital
intensity is not surprising and is consistent with similar findings
2in the aforementioned studies ; it suggests that capital intensity 
may be a barrier to entry and makes for higher seller concentration. 
The implication of this high correlation is the possibility of 
multicollinearity in the regression analyses.
The high correlation between the tariff rates and import intensity 
is also important because it shows that there is a negative
1 The confidence interval at the 95% level is
where N is the number of observations in the. sample. There is a 
one-to-one relationship between Z and the correlation coefficient 
r. Kane, E.J. (1969). Economic Statistics and Econometrics, 
Harper and Row, International edition.
2  C h a p t e r  3 ,  p p . 3 4 .
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relationship between the chosen tariff rates and the relevant 
import/home consumption r atios. The high correlation between 
tariffs and import intensities however would not cause any 
multicollinearity since these varaibles are used as alternatives 
in the relevant regression equations.
Table 2 reports the estimated equations, explaining the price- 
cost margins.
The coefficients for the tariff rates (TR) are positive and
significant for both years (eqs. 1 and 3), indicating that
protection allows domestic industries to raise prices and earn
higher rates of profit than they could have under free trade'*'.
Correspondingly the negative and satistically significant impact
of import-competition (eqs. 2 and 4) suggests that an increase in
2imports may force firms to lower their prices .
The coefficients for seller concentration are positive but 
statistically insignificant. The insignificant results have 
been caused by multicollinearity between the seller concentration 
and the capital intensity. The re-estimation of the equations 
with the exclusion of capital intensity confirmed that Seller 
concentration and price-cost margins are positively related.
1 The same outcome is shown in the study by Hitiris T. (1978)
2 This relationship for the first time was shown in the study by 
Esposito, L. and Esposito, F. (1971).
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The reason for a positive relationship between seller concentration 
and profitability is well known, namely: high concentration enables 
collusion among the dominant firms, which consequently refrain from 
excessive competition, raise their prices and earn excess profits. 
There is also a contesting view that higher profitability in 
concentrated industries is due to their higher efficiency. The 
coefficients for capital intensity, growth of demand, and advertising 
intensity are all positive and statistically significant for both 
years, 1963 and 1968.
Table 3 presents the equations explaining industry output. The 
results show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between tariffs and industry output (Table 3, equations 1 and 3).
This indicates that protection enables domestic firms to expand 
their production. Correspondingly a negative and statistically 
significant impact of import-competition (Table 3, equations 2 
and 4) may force firms to restrict their production.
The coefficients for seller concentration are negative and 
significant in all the equations. This is an interesting outcome, 
as it gives support to the argument that dominant firms may collude 
in keeping their output low, in order to raise or maintain their 
p r i c e s .
The other interesting outcome is the positive and highly significant 
relationship between U.K. industries' output and OECD imports. This 
supports our hypothesis that, the differences in the output of the 
chosen industries are partly related to the differences in the
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In brief, the above results suggest that home firms might take 
advantage of the tariff protection and increase their prices 
as well as their production. Correspondingly an increase in 
import-competition may lead to a decrease in the prices and in 
the level of output.
We are now able to use these results to estimate the welfare 
effects of tariffs. This will be carried out in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATES OF THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE TARIFF
This chapter aims to estimate the welfare effects of the tariff. The
procedure will draw upon the theoretical analysis of chapter 2 and will
make use of the regression estimates reported in chapter 4.
5.1 Formulation of the Welfare Effects :
The welfare effects are illustrated in Figure 1 which is a
reproduction of Figure 2 , chapter 2.
D1D1 -^s hk® compensated demand curve for home products under 
free trade, i.e. when the domestic price of the imports 
is OfW-L
D2D2 is the corresponding demand curve under the tariff
situation, (the tariff is assumed to be such as to
raise the domestic price of the imports to 0^ 2)
CfflP^  is the price of home products when there is no tariff on 
the inqports
0^P2 is the price of home products under tariff protection
CC is the home producers' marginal cost curve
FF is the compensated home demand curve for foreign products 
under free trade, i.e. when price of the home product is
Price of
Home
Products
Price of 
Foreign
F
W,
w .
Domestic Output
FIGURE 1
As explained in chapter 2 the imposition of tariffs initially 
causes a loss in consumer surplus only to those who consume the 
foreign goods; consumers of home products would suffer a loss 
only if the tariffs induced an increase in the price of home products. 
Moreover, these two items of welfare costs may be offset by a possible 
benefit in the form of additional profits of the home firms. In 
terms of Figure 1, the net welfare effect is an increase in home 
country welfare if :
P 1P2 A 3H 3 + C1H1H 3C 3 =• P 1P 2 A 3H2 + TRS
where (P, P 0 A_EY + C.ELH_C_) shows the increase in the home firms'( 1 2  3 3 1 1 3  3)
profits resulting from the tariff, P^P^A^H^ is the loss.'of. 
consumer surplus for consumers of home goods, TRS is the net loss 
of surplus for consumers, of foreign goods.
The above can be simplified and the condition for a welfare gain may 
be written as :
C 1H 1H 3C 3 > A 3H 2B 3 + TRS 
The net effect of eliminating tariffs is the converse of the above.
Tariff elimination will increase home country welfare if :
A 3H 2H 3 + TRS ” C1H 1H 3C 3
The above analyses clearly indicate that the elimination of tariffs 
may create welfare losses as well as gains. This implies that 
there will be an optimum tariff for each industry which will 
maximise the net welfare gain. Thus the welfare estimates of 
tariffs could be made with reference to either :
(i) the optimum rate of tariff for each industry and
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However, the main purpose is to compare the welfare estimates from 
the present model with that of the traditional theory. This can 
be done most readily by the latter alternative. Thus in this 
study we will keep to the latter only, i.e. examine the welfare 
effect of moving from the existing tariffs to free trade.
( i i )  t h e  c o m p le t e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t a r i f f s .
The task now is to express each o f  the above three areas in terms 
of empirically measurable variables.
The area TRS can be approximated as :
TRS = V 2 dM.dP (1)
= ^  dM.T.P (2)
where dP is the decrease in home price of foreign goods due
to the elimination of tariffs;
dM is the corresponding increase in imports;
t is the tariff rate [= ;
( pw'
Pw is the world price of the imports
t ( jtt \T is ^ + ^ |= -^-j which is the proportionate decrease
in the price of foreign goods.
We know that :
dM = e„ M  (3)'m ( p
where e' is the compensated price elasticity of impart demand (ignoring 
the s i g n ) . We assumed that this elasticity is. constant and 
independent of the price of the home'products.
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I
Substituting (3) into (2) we can write
TRS - \[em  i M.P.T
= \  em  T2. M.P (4)
Alternatively equation (4) can be expressed in terms of the 
world price of the imports.
1 4-21, tTRS = / em  -r M.PW  (1 + t)
2 U + t J 2
4 e m 1 + 1 M‘Pw
In order to estimate TRS we will use previous researchers 
empirical estimtes of e m .
Next let us consider the area A^fflffl . This can be approximated 
as :
W 3 - " W s  X  H 3H 2 (6)
Where A^ffl is the change in the price of home products due to the 
elimination of tariffs, fflffl is the change in the consumption of 
home goods, due to that change in price.
A^ffl can be estimated as :
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P d an ( l )
a 3h 3 = apd = - j - y  (7)
where n is the price-cost margin under the tariff and dn is the change 
in the price-cost margin resulting from the elimination of tariffs.
The change in production H 3H 2 can be measured as :
p a j
H 3H 2 = ,ea Q j— j (8)
where e^ is the compensated price elasticity of demand for home products 
(ignoring the sign), and Q is the Level of home production under the 
tariff.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) we can write :
p d an d p .
A 3H 2H 3 = 35 i T n "  x e d Q
, a n  _  * * * *x ed Q1 - n u * i-n 
an2
= h ed (Q-Pd) "(Y  - n)2 (9)
The value of dll can be obtained from the regression equation (1) in
(2 )chapter 4 which equals a $ ft . We can thus rewrite (9) as follows:
2  4-2a5 *
A H2 H 3 =  ^  e d  (Q o P d )  0 ( IO )
a  - n r
(1) Price-cost margin II is defined as :
pd - c • cn = — _ _  = 1 -
P d  P d
where P d is the domestic price under the tariff, C is the cost 
of production of one unit of home commodities. We thus have :
an _ c _ 1 - n
^ a  ~ Pd2 " Fa
or = d II
p d 1 -  n
_  p d d nand finally : dP. - ______d 1 - n
“  ^ 4  ~ c o n ' t d .
It is interesting to show that under certain conditions the price 
elasticity of demand for home products (e^) may be equal to the price 
elasticity of demand for imports (era) . In order to present this 
condition we employed the following Cobb-Douglas utility function : 
a 6
U =  A q  n f
where U is the utility enjoyed by the consumers, q is the consumption of 
home products and m  is the consumed imports, while a and 3 are respectively 
the exponents of q and m f which can be expressed as utility elasticities
( dU , dq Q dU , dmfa = -— / - +  and 3 = —  / ~  }C U q U m  )
We than showed (Appendix D) that, when a equals 3, the price elasticity
of demand for home products equals the price elasticity of demand for imports,
Finally we turn to area This can be measured as :
C1H 1H 3C 3 = h 1h 3 x E y C y (11)
where H 1 H 3 is the change in home output resulting from the elimination of 
the tariff, and ItyCq is the profit per unit of home production under free 
trade.
Cont'd..
(2) From chapter 4 we have :
TI =  aQ +  a^C R  +  a 2 CLR +  a^GD +  a^A R  +  a^ D IC
where II is the industry price-cost margin under the tariff, CR, CLR,
GD, AR andDI-CJ are respectively the Seller Concentration, Capital 
Intensity, growth of demand, advertising intensity and degree of 
import competition (or tariff protection). Using (t) as the nominal 
tariff rate, we can have the following specification from the above 
equation :
II — + a^CR + a2CLR + a^GD + a^AR + ^5 -^
we now have
a n  > n—  = a5 or d n = a5dt 
Due to the elimination of tariffs dt = t and thus we have: d II = a^t
(1) See Appendix D.
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fflffl can be obtained from the regression equation (2) of chapter 4, 
Denoting this by dQ we have ^
-  n i ddQ =
b^t (1 - II) - QP^.dll
Pd  (1 - n )  (12)
as dH = we get
dQ «
jb3,t - b 3 H t  - as QPdtj
Pa (i - n> (13)
(1) From chapter 4 we have :
V  = ffl + fflCR + b20DI + b 3DIC (equation 2 , chapter 4)
where V is the money value of home production under the tariff 
and is equal to (Q . P<rf , Q  is the level of home production 
consumed domestically, Pd is the/price of home goods under 
tariffs, and CR, ODI' and DIC are respectively the seller 
concentration, correction for the industry size and degree 
of import competion (or tariff protection). Using (t) as 
the nominal tariff rate, we can have the following 
specification from the above equation.
V = bQ + fflCR + fflODI + b 3t 
We can now have :
av , dQ—  =  b 3 =  _  . P fl +  —  . Q
Due to the elimination of tariffs dt = t and thus we have :
b
dQ.Pd + QdPd 
3 = t
fflt - QdPd
Thus dQ =
a  q p  an
p a a n  b a t "  “ TKnowing that dP^ = ------  we can write : dQ = — - ----------
d  1 -  n p a
b 3t(l - n) _ QPddH
pffl (I ~ n)
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5.2
(1 )
C1H 1 iS tbe amount of tbe P rofit P?r o n ± t under free trade and 
is given by the relationship
• k ‘k
C1H1 = n p (14)
* * where II is the price-cost margin in free trade, and P is the
corresponding price of the home products. We know that
n* = n - a n  (15)
P* = p d “ dPd (16)
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) we get 
c l H l  = ( n  -  d H ) ( P d -  dP d j
( n - a n  ) p , -d l -  ni
As dll = a_.t we can write :5
C H  _ pa (n - a 5t j j i -  n - a 5tj
C1 H1 -  X -  II u  n
Substituting (17) and (13) into (11) we get :
Sb 3t “ b 3 11 b ^ d ^ l  ( n " a5t-S j1 “ 11 "  a5bJC H H C =-----------------------------—  5 —  --
( i  -  n )
(18)
Data Employed :
In order to estimate the welfare effects of tariff elimination we
need data on the price-elasticity of demand for imports and home
products, tariff rates, imports, industries’ output and price-cost
margins. Data on the tariffs, the imports, the output, and the price-cost
(1)margins are the same as m  the previous chapter ' . The remaining data are
D e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  A p p e n d ix  C .
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a s  f o l l o w s .
Price-elasticities :
Ideally we need estimates of price elasticities for home products and 
for competing imports, disaggregated for each U.K. industry (or commodity 
group). Unfortunately, such detailed data are not available for all the 
industries concerned.
Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976) provide a rather comprehensive set 
of estimates collected from various studies for a group of different 
countries, including the U . K . ^  However, there are three problems in 
applying these estimates for the U.K.
(i) The estimates are only available for certain groups of
industries. Hence to complete the data for the U.K. 
we can make use of the estimates given for other 
countries. Critics might be sceptical about using the 
elasticity estimates of other countries for the U.K., 
because the share of U.K. imports in its consumption 
might be different from the share of other countries' 
imports in their consumption. Alternatively, we can 
use the aggregated price elasticity which is readily 
available for the U.K. The afoxementioneri study 
contains a range of the aggregated estimates (collected
(1) S t e m ,  Francis and Schumacher (1976) . Price Elasticities in
International Tra d e . Macmillan Press Ltd., pp.2
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from various studies) as' well as the best suggested 
estimates Naturally, our choice was the best
estimate of the price elasticity of imports for non-food 
manufactures.
i
(ii) The second problem is that the chosen price elasticity is
an estimate derived from an ordinary demand curve, whereas
our study requires a compensated price elasticity of import
demand. Hence we use the following formula to calculate
(2)the compensated price elasticity
em  = e 'm + ar> 
where em  is the compensated price elasticity of import demand, 
e'm is the price elasticity of the ordinary demand curve, a is 
the proportion of total expenditure spent on imports, and n is 
the income elasticity of import demand.
We calculate a by dividing the value of U.K. imports of non-food 
manufacturers by the total domestic consumption of these 
commodities. For ri we use the estimate given in the study by 
Hauthakker and Magee (1969) . By substituting the relevant 
values for e'm  , a, and n into the above formula, the value of 
em  was estimated to be -1*02*
(1) S t e m ,  R.M. et al (1976) compiled the results of nine separate 
estimates given.for the price elasticity of U.K. demand of non­
food manufactures. The value of the estimates range from
- 0.66 to -6.00 and the best suggested estimate is -1.22 ibid, pp.. 16
(2) Henderson, J.M. and Quandt, R.B. (1971). Microeconomic Theory: 
a Mathematical Approach, McGraw-Hill Ltd., p p . 32.
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(iii) We also require an estimate of the price elasticity of 
compensated demand for .home products. Unfortunately, 
such an estimate is not readily available, and its direct 
. estimation, though useful, would be to some extent outside 
the scope of this study0 However as we have shown before, 
under certain conditions (described in Appendix D ) , the 
price elasticity of demand for imports can be used for the 
price elasticity of demand for home productsc
Given that there are problems concerning the estimate of the 
price elasticity, it would be interesting to use an alternative 
• measure in addition to the one described above. Such an 
alternative estimate might be inferred from the concept of 
the assumed profit maximisation of the home producers.
Economic theory suggests that in a profit maximising monopoly, 
the price elasticity of demand is equal to the inverse of the 
monopoly's price-cost margin We therefore have :
1
ed ~  n
(1) The following expression gives the marginal revenue of a monopoly:
MR = p f l  ~( e d ) (r)
where MR is the marginal revenues, P is the price and ed is the
price elasticity of demand.
We know that a profit maximising monopoly uses the following 
relationship to set its price.
MR = MC (ii)
where MC is the marginal cost. We would therefore have :
M r  =  M P  =  P M -  1  1
where e^ is the price elasticity of demand for home products, and 
II is the price-cost margin of home producers. In order to estimate 
e^ we use the value of II from oufr regression equation: the average
value of II for the years 1963 and 1968 is approximately 10.5 per 
'cent. We thus obtain
1 1 r-
ed = 0.105 =
Admittedly, this estimate of e^ seems rather high in comparison 
with our previous estimate (1.02). This may be for the following 
reason. The estimate of the price-cost margin II pertains to the 
industries as a whole, whereas the above formula applies only to 
those firms that act as profit maximisers. The implication of this
is that the average price-cost margin employed above might be an under­
estimation of the required margin and as a result we may have over­
estimated the relevant price elasticity (e^).
It would, therefore, be more appropriate to employ the price-cost 
margins of the dominant firms in each industry, i.e. a few firms 
with the greatest share of the industry1s total sal e s . Such a 
procedure is, however, inhibited by the lack of necessary data for 
1963 and 1968. '
(1) Cont'd..
By definition we have :
P-MC (iv)
where II is the price-cost margin. Substituting (iv) into
(iii) will give the following :
(v )
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5 . 3  T h e  E s t i m a t e s  :
The analysis of the preceding section will now be used to estimate 
the welfare effects of a hypothetical elimination of the tariffs. 
Equations (5) and (10) will be used to estimate the welfare gains 
while equation (18) will be used to estimate the welfare loss. 
Bringing these together the net welfare effect is :
If our empirical estimates show that this expression to be positive 
(negative) we will state that tariff elimination will increase 
(decrease) home welfare.
Our interest is not only in the absolute magnitude of the welfare 
estimates but also in how they compare with the estimates that may 
be obtained from the traditional model of tariffs. The latter 
makes no distinction between the consumers of foreign and home g o o d s . 
Moreover it abstracts from the effect on the profits of home producers. 
The implication of the latter point is that all consumers are assumed 
to experience the same proportionate decline in prices, and thus 
the welfare gain is dependent only on the increase in imports. 
Accordingly the traditional measure of the welfare gain i s ^  :
(1) Johnson, H.G. (1971). Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs, London, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
fcNet welfare effect = h e™ -— -— —m 1 + t
5 *
+ 'S e d  ( Q * ^ )  (]_ _ n ) 2
(b3t - b^IIt - QP^aj-t) (II - a,_t) (1 - IT - a,_t)
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Net welfare gain = h em  -— 7— —  MoPmi + t \
t (20)
The three separate components of equation 19 (equations 5, 10 
and 18) and the net welfare effects are shown in tables 1 and 2 .
The only difference between the tables is the application of two 
different price elasticities (-1.02 in table 1 and - 9 C5 in table 2 ) c 
Hence, the gain of consumer surplus in table 1(A]_) is much smaller 
than that in table 2 (A2)o
A  comparison between the results of this model and those obtained 
from the application of the traditional model, gives rise to 
interesting implications« With regard to the consumer, our model 
shows an overall higher gain of consumer surplus (Aq > a]_i and A 2 > a2]_) . 
This is because our model allows for the gains to the consumers of 
home goods as well as the gains to the consumers of foreign goods.
In contrast with the traditional model, this study shows a loss of 
welfare caused by the fall in home production and profit. The 
loss of welfare derived from our model (in both tables) outweights 
the welfare gains of the tariff elimination. The estimates of 
welfare loss, expressed as percentages of home industry output, 
range from 0.819% to 1.276% and from 0.5.97% to 1.045% for 1963 and 
1968 respectively.
Finally, it would be interesting to compare the outcome of this 
study with those of previous studies. Such a comparison will
however be neither easy nor accurate. The difficulty in accuracy
arises from the differences between the methodologies used and the 
objectives pursued in this and other studies. For example, some 
studies are undertaken within a general equilibrium framework,
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whereas our model is based on a partial equilibrium analysis.
The objective of some studies is' to estimate the static and 
dynamic consequences of trade liberalisation, while our study 
‘is concerned only with the former. Tariff elimination 
(or reduction) by one country is often assumed to be a part of 
a multilateral trade policy followed by a group of countries, 
whereas our study assumes a unilateral tariff elimination.
However, whilst acknowledging the existence of these problems, 
we decided that a limited comparison of findings may give a more 
comprehensive view of our results. A s a consequence we chose to 
compare our findings with two recent studies; namely, Batchelor, r. 
and Minford, P. (1977) and Cambridge Economic Policy Group 
(CEPG, 1977).
The intention in the study by Batchelor and Minford is to compare 
the short and the long-run costs of devaluation and import controls. 
Our interest here, is to make a comparison between the findings of 
this study as regards to the welfare costs of tariff protection, with 
those of our own study. The authors calculate the short-run welfare 
loss of tariffs on the basis of an imperfect competition model. The 
model assumes that, in the short-run, when a tariff is imposed, the 
price of the import substitute need not increase by the same 
percentage as the import price. This is because there is only a 
limited switch out of imports into the domestic substitute. However, 
for the calculation of long-run welfare losses, the import-substitute 
price is raised by the same percentage as the import price. Thus, 
by using different price elasticities for the short and the long-run 
(-1.2 for the short-run and-8.1 for the long-run), the authors
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calculate the costs of protection for different tariff l e v e l s ^ .
For an eight per cent increase in the existing tariff rate, the
costs of protection, as a percentage of U.K. GDP, amounts to 0.04%
(2)in the short-run, and to 0.22% in the long-run
The average rate of tariffs in our study is approximately 8.1 
per cent (averaged over 1963 and 1968 for the chosen industries). 
Our study shows that the elimination of tariffs, i.e. the reduction 
of tariffs by the average rate of about 8.1 per cent, would benefit
(1) In this study the welfare loss of a tariff at rate T  is,
w = h nT2v
Where W is the welfare loss, h is the corresponding 
elasticity of import demand with respect to tariff, V is
the value of imports prior to the tariff. Only the value
of ri differ according to whether we are considering a 
short-run limited substitution environment or a long-run 
competitive environment. In terms of the demand, supply 
and substitution we have;
n s  =  ( 1  -  f r )  c r
nL = £s + U d " ES > / m
Where n and r\ are respectively the short-run and the long- S Li
run elasticities of imports, X  is the reaction coefficient 
of home price with respect to the increase in the price of 
competitive imports, c is the price elasticity of import 
substitutions, ffl and ffl are respectively the long-run 
elasticities of supply and demand, and m is the share of 
imports in the British market.
(2) In this study the existing rate of tariffs (on average) is 
about 5 per cent, the 8 per cent increase is in addition 
to the existing rate, Op. cit, pp.68.
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the consumers of imported goods by 0.033% (averaged over 1963 
and 1968 and expressed as percentage of the value of domestic 
output) when price elasticity is -1.02, and 0.30% when price- 
elasticity is - 9 . 5 ^ .  As the above figures show, there is 
close correspondence between our estimates and those of the 
aforementioned study.
A comparison of the outcome of our study with that of the CEPG
is a rather more difficult task. The comparison we intend to
make is based on the estimate given by CEPG (1977). According
to the CEPG, average rate of tariff , on imports entering domestic
expenditure, would have to be about 31% in order to raise the
(2)volume of U.K. GDP by lO% Our model does not give any direct
estimate of changes in the domestic producers' output. In order to
make possible a comparison between the CEPG and our own estimates,
we therefore need to calculate the change in the volume of output for
(3) .our model, when the existing tariffs are all raised to 31% The
change in the volume of output is given by equation (13)
(1) It should be noted that we only compare the gain of consumer
surplus to the consumers of imported goods with the estimates 
of Batchlor and Minford. This is because their study does
not differentiate between imported goods and the goods which
are produced domestically.
(2) Godley, W. and May, R.M. (1977). "The Macroeconomic
Implication of Devaluation and Import Restriction", Cambridge 
Economic Re v i e w , N o . 3, p p . 36.
(3) As mentioned before, the average rate of tariff in our study
is about 8.1 per cent. Hence, the increase of the existing
rate to 31 per cent would mean to increase the existing rate
by 300% on average.
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i n  o u r  m o d e l (1) We t h e r e f o r e  h a v e  :
B3t  -  b 3l l t  -  a g Q P ^ t
dQ
Q
pd(i - n) (21)
Q
-  b 3l t t  -  a ^ Q P ^ t
QPd (l ~ n)
x 100 (22)
We then used equation (22) to calculate the percentage change 
in the level of domestic output, when the existing tariffs are 
all raised to 31%* Our estimate shows an average (over 1963 
and 1968) increase of about 38% in the level of domestic output*
It is obvious that our estimate of the tariff - induced change 
of domestic output is much higher than that of the CEPG. The 
difference may be partially explained by the following reasons*
(i) The CEPG's estimate is derived from a macroeconomic 
model designed within a general equilibrium framework, 
whereas our model is based on a partial equilibrium 
analysis* Hence we have assumed that there are 
sufficient resources to increase the industries' output.
(ii) Our model assumes that the industries' costs are 
constant* Relaxation of this assumption may reduce 
the level of output that the industries are prepared 
to produce in order to maintain maximum profits*
(1) Equation- (13) is as follows :
dQ
b^t - b 3nt - a^QP^t
P a d  - f i )
where t is the difference between 31% and the existing
tariffs of the industries. The other characters are
d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e
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However, the extent of the difference between our study 
and that of the CEPG (1977), causes us to be cautious 
about our estimate of the change in domestic output.
5.4 Limitations and Extensions of the Analyses :
The above estimates of the welfare effects of the tariff have gone 
beyond the estimates that could have been obtained from the application 
of the traditional theory of tariffs, by incorporating suck likely 
phenomena as product differentiation between foreign and home products 
and pricing in excess of marginal costs. However, our procedure has 
involved some simplifying assumptions, some of which may be mentioned.
Firstly, in estimating the profits of the home firms, no distinction 
was made between the private costs and the social costs. However, if 
the protected industries were to draw resources from industries where 
prices exceed the social marginal cost, the private marginal cost of 
the protected industry may exceed the social cost. In such a case 
our procedure would in general under-estimate the adverse effect of 
tariff removal. There may, however, be an important exception to this 
point. One reason for the excess of private over social cost is. that 
the protected firms may use imported inputs that are subject to tariffs. 
This may be of importance in the event of a general reduction in 
tariffs. A general tariff cut will mean that the firms concerned will 
experience a downward shift in its cost curve as well as its demand 
curve. This may induce a decrease in the price charged to home 
consumers and would add to the welfare gains of tariff reduction. In 
such a case our procedure might have led to an under-estimation of the 
welfare gain of tariff removal.
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Secondly, we implicitly assumed that there are sufficient resources 
to increase industry output. In reality the resources are scarce.
It would, therefore, be more realistic to consider an upward sloping 
cost curve in the place of the simplifying horizontal cost curve.
Thirdly, we have assumed that the home output is sold entirely in 
the home market. Allowing for the possibility that a proportion 
of the output may be exported leads to two further considerations:
(a) If the tariff brought about a decrease in the home price 
of the home product there would (in the absence of price- 
discrimination) also follow a decrease in the export price.
In other words, the welfare gain by way of the additional 
surplus to the consumers of home products might partly be 
offset by a reduction in the export profits. To this 
extent the study might have over-estimated the welfare 
gains of removing t a r iffs.
(b) Tariff elimination^by the home country may be part of an 
agreed exercise in multilateral tariff elimination (or 
reductions). In such case home firms would face reduced 
tariffs in export m a r k e t s . By ignoring this possibility 
the study might have under-estimated the welfare gains of 
tariff elimination.
Finally, our study is based on a partial equilibrium analysis. A 
more complete- study would involve a general equilibrium analysis: two 
implications of such an extension may be mentioned. A decrease in 
tariffs for the industries concerned will release resources from these
-  8 1  -
industries. If these resources can be employed in some 
firms which can earn super-nbrmal profits, these gains 
should be added to our calculation; by ignoring these gains 
we have underestimated the benefits of tariff reduction.
However, some of the released resources may not be employed 
elsewhere. In such case it would be necessary for the 
government to implement a monetary and fiscal policy to 
maintain full employment with price stability. This in turn, 
would mean that the analysis must take account of the possible 
effects of trade liberalisation on the exchange rate, and other 
macroeconomic variables such as the rate of interest.
A more complete analysis of the welfare effects of tariff 
elimination would need to take these limitations into consideration.
-  8 2  -
APPENDIX A
This appendix proves that in a particular case of constant elasticity 
schedule the tariff may have no effect on the industry price. In 
other w o r d s , this appendix is to show that in such a c a s e , the 
elasticity of excess demand curve will not be affected by the tariff. 
Thus the profit-maximizing price will remain unchanged. Consider a 
system described by the following equations :
price elasticity of home demand, Q g is the foreign supply of the product, 
P g is the world price, (3 is the price elasticity of foreign supply,
rate of tariff. Eq. (1) states that the home demand is a function 
of the home price, (2) reveals that the foreign supply is a function 
of the price received by foreign firms, (3) defines the demand for the 
monopolist’s product and (4) expresses that the price in the tariff 
imposing country will exceed the world price by the amount of tariff.
From the above equations we can formulate the price elasticity of the 
excess demand curve. Denoting the elasticity by E^ we have :
A P a
A P d (1)
Q, C2)s s
DE (3)
P d P (1 + t) s (4)
Qd is the home demand for the product, P^ is the home price, a is the
D is the demand for the monopolist's product, and t is the ad-valorem E
-  8 3  -
dD.
E =  x
E-
dP D_ C5)
By using equations (1) to (4) we get,
dD_E
dP dP
AQ
\-Zl
dP
CLAP a - l P3B d
-  1
( 1+  t f
(6)
Now substitute (6) into C5), shows that
E
X
OfAP & P3B -d
(1 + 1 ) AP _ p 3- B  d
(1+t)^
(7)
Now if | a | = 3  e cg. (7) can be simplified to
Since a is a constant, we have
dE
dt =  o
In other words when the price elasticity of home demand (ignoring the 
sign) equals the elasticity of foreign supply, the price elasticity of 
excess demand will equal each of these and be independent of the tariff 
rate,,
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APPENDIX B
Throughout this study it was often necessary to aggregate or 
disaggregate different classification in order to fit U.K. 1963 
input-output classification. This appendix gives the correspondence 
between the 1963 U.K. input-output classification and other 
classifications used in this study.
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APPENDIX C
This Appendix discusses the sources and description of the data used 
in the regression analyses. The data are shown in statistical tables 
below.
1 o Price-Cost Margin;
Price-cost margin is the gross profit before tax expressed as 
a percentage of the sales of the industry,, Gross profit and 
other trading income is defined as factor income (except income 
from employment) plus gross trading profits of companies minus 
stock appreciationo Sales are defined as the total commodity 
supply. These definitions and the data for gross profit and 
total sales are taken from the United Kingdom Input-Output Tables 
for 1963 and 1968, Central Statistical Office (1970 and 1973).
2. Output :
Output is measured by the money value of the domestic output 
consumed at home. This was calculated by subtracting the value 
of import and export of each commodity from its total sales value. 
Sales of commodity are defined as above. The relevant figures 
are taken from U.K. Input-Output Tables for 1963 and 1968, Central 
Statistical Office (1970 and 1973).
3. Seller Concentration :
Seller concentration, is measured by the share of the five largest 
enterprise in the industry's total sales. The data for sales of 
the five leading enterprises were taken from the census of 
production (Summary Tables) for 1963 and 1968, Board of Trade (1970) 
and Department of Trade and Industry, Business Statistics Office (1972).
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Capital intensity is measured by the ratio of the industry capital 
expenditure over its total number of employees. Capital 
expenditure is defined as the total acquisition of land and new or 
existing buildings, plant and machinery and vehicles less disposal.
Data on these items were obtained from the United Kingdom Census 
of Production (Summary Tables) for 1963 and 1968, Board of Trade 
(1970) and Department of Trade and Industry Business Statistics 
Office (1972).
Growth of Demand :
Growth of demand is measured by the annual rate of growth of sales 
(at current prices) between 1958 and 1963 and between 1963 and 
1968. Sales figures are taken from U.K. Input-Output Tables 
(1963 and 1968) and U.K. Census of Production (Summary Tables) for 
1958 and 1963.
Advertising Intensity :
Advertising intensity is measured by the ratio of advertising 
expenditure over industries' total sales* Advertising expenditures 
are taken from the U.K. Census of Production (Summary Tables) for. ;• 
1963 and 1968.
Foreign Competition :
Foreign competition is measured by either import competition or 
tariff protection.
Import competition is measured by the ratio of import/home 
consumption, where' consumption is that of the home production only.
C a p i t a l  I n t e n s i t y  :
-  90 -
The data were taken from the United Kingdom Input-Output Tables 
for 1963 and 1968, Central Statistical Office (1970 and 1973).
Tariff protection is measured by the weighted nominal tariff 
rate. The relevant tariff rates are taken from the study by 
Kitchin, P.D. (1975.) .
8. Correction for the Industry Size :
V
The chosen corrective measure ia the imports of OECD countries 
exclusive of the imports of U.K. and Japan. OECD imports are 
taken from Statistics of Foreign Trade, OECD (1963 and 1968) 
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APPENDIX D
This appendix derives the conditions under which the price elasticity of 
import demand is equal to the price elasticity of demand for home products. 
Let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas utility function for a consumer 
who consumes home products as well as imported goods.
U = Aqa m^
Where U is the utility enjoyed by the consumer, q is the consumption of 
home products and m is the consumed imports, while a and 3 are the exponents 
of q and m respectively. These components (a and 3) can be expressed as 
the utility elasticities of the consumption of home products and of imports 
respectively1 .
The equality of the price elasticity of home demand and that of the import 
demand requires the following relationship :
e _ _ ed - m
.dP
^ d  q  ^ m  m (2)
n r  ■ ■ := ~  .
* p T  dm * pm
„  a 3U = Aq m
In U = In A + ct. In <J + 3 In m
din U = 
din q
dU 
U 
• dq 
q
= a din U 
din m
dU
U
dm
m
-  9 6  -
Where is the price elasticity of home demand, em  is the price elasticity 
of import demand, P3 is the price of domestic products and Pm  is the price 
of imports.
Assuming that the price of a commodity (domestic or foreign product) is 
equal to the marginal utility derived from its consumption, P3 and Pm  can 
be calculated as follows :
du _ « - l 3
= dq = q m
dUP = — =■ m  dm
3 -1 a A  8 m  q
(3)
(4)
It follows from the above that :
dq
a -2  6A.a (a-l) q m
and similarly we can write :
(5)
dP.m
dm
n *1 \ 3“2 aA.3 (3-1) m  q (6)
Substituting (3), (4), (5) and (6) into (2) give the following :
q_______. . .  ot" 2 3 A. a (a-l) q m _ a-l 3 A  a q m
A.6 (8-l)mS' 2 q“ m_ q 3-1 a A 3 m  q
a-l = 3 -1
and finally a = (7)
The above expression therefore is the condition for equality of the price 
elasticity of import demand and that of the demand for home products.
-  9 7  -
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